The permit requirements are essentially identical to the license requirements. Additionally, all entertainers working within a sexually oriented business must obtain a permit from the Board. See Metropolitan Code of Laws 6.54.030(A). The Ordinance requires all "sexually oriented businesses" to obtain a license issued by the Sexually Oriented Businesses Licensing Board before being permitted to operate. ![]() 37-43) delivered a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. 00-5881.īefore: MARTIN, Chief Judge WELLFORD and SUHRHEINRICH, Circuit Judges.ĭelivered the opinion of the court, in which SUHRHEINRICH, J., joined. Dean (argued), Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson County, Nashville, TN, for Defendants-Appellants for No. Abrams (briefed), Metropolitan Department of Law, Nashville, TN, Karl F. Herbison (briefed), Nashville, TN, for Plaintiffs-Appellees for No. Abrams, Sirkin, Pinales, Mezibov & Schwartz, Cincinnati, OH, John E. Wilkins (briefed), Shafer & Associates, P.C., Lansing, MI, Michael F. Dean (argued), Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson County, Nashville, TN, for Defendants-Appellants/Cross-Appellees for Nos. Herbison (briefed), Nashville, TN, for Plaintiffs-Appelless/Cross-Appellants for Nos. Kinsley (briefed), Sirkin, Pinales, Mezibov & Schwartz, Cinicinnati, OH, John E. Dean, METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF NASHVILLE & DAVIDSON COUNTY, Nashville, Tennessee, for Defendants-Appelless for No. Shafer, SHAFER & ASSOCIATES, P.C., Lansing, Michigan, for Plaintiffs. Abrams, METROPOLITAN DEPARTMENT OF LAW, Nashville, Tennessee, for Defendants. Herbison, Nashville, Tennessee, for Plaintiffs.įrancis H. Kinsley, SIRKIN, PINALES, MEZIBOV & SCHWARTZ, Cincinnati, Ohio, John E. Wilkins, SHAFER & ASSOCIATES, P.C., Lansing, Michigan, Michael F. 2323, 110 L.Ed.2d 148 (Stevens, J., dissenting).Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee at Nashville., Nos. ![]() "he Court has no more constitutional authority in civil cases than in criminal cases to disregard current law or to treat similarly situated litigants differently." American Trucking, at 214, 110 S.Ct. When this Court applies a rule of federal law to the parties before it, that rule is the controlling interpretation of federal law and must be given full retroactive effect in all cases still open on direct review and as to all events, regardless of whether such events predate or postdate our announcement of the rule. Virginia Department of Taxation, 509 U.S. Justice Harlan criticized "he notion that cases before us on direct review need not be adjudicated in accordance with those legal principles governing at the time we are possessed of jurisdiction in the case." Id. only as a correlative of our dual duty to decide those cases over which we have jurisdiction and to apply the Federal Constitution as one source of the matrix of governing legal rules." Mackey v. In that respect, the dissent's statement that the ordinance "has been all along" - but "with two qualifications" - glosses over the fact that the most critical of those "qualifications" is the very factor that the law of the case (and hence the continued need for lawyering on Deja Vu's part) held to be a constitutional deficiency: the then-existing purely discretionary potential for judicial review.Īs Justice Harlan clearly explained, the Supreme Court "announce new constitutional rules. But even if it did, that kind of responsive change cannot create a special circumstance sufficient to defeat an award of attorneys' fees. We express no view as to whether that change in state procedure eliminates the concerns that we expressed in Deja Vu I. Metro points out that the Tennessee common law writ of certiorari has since been altered to require judicial review in First Amendment cases, although its counsel admitted during oral argument that the alteration was the direct result of this litigation. That distinguishes this case from the circumstances of Z.J. ![]() That is particularly true given our conclusion in Deja Vu I, 274 F.3d at 400-03, that Metro's judicial review provisions failed to meet even a lesser requirement of judicial access because they relied on a discretionary writ of certiorari and thus might lead to no judicial review at all.
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